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ASSESSMENT OF RISKS
INTRODUCED TO SAFETY CRITICAL
SOFTWARE BY AGILE PRACTICES
— A SOFTWARE ENGINEER’S PERSPECTIVE
Abstract In this article we investigate the problem of applying agile practices into safety-
critical projects. The goal of our research is to investigate potential beneﬁts
from introducing agile practices into safety-critical environment and to present a
solution providing for balancing agile approach with more disciplined assurance
techniques, bringing the best of the two worlds together. In this article we
present the supporting ideas such as assurance argument patterns along with
a case study. The case study investigates how software engineers perceive risks
associated with the introduction of agile practices and collect their ideas on how
these risks could be mitigated.
Keywords software development, safety-critical projects, agile practices, experimental
assessment, TRUST-IT
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1651. Introduction
Agile methodologies have grown in popularity since the presentation of the Agile
Manifesto in 2001 [1]. They were introduced as an alternative to plan-driven me-
thodologies, which were considered as being too restrictive in some circumstances,
in particular, while dealing with volatile requirements and ever changing market de-
mands. In such situations, heavy-weight documentation and low ﬂexibility associated
with plan-driven approach could have an impeding eﬀect on software development
process [13]. In response to these concerns agile methodologies have oﬀered practices
which value a close relationship with clients, allow a more relaxed approach towards
documentation and provide a ﬂexible development lifecycle based on short iterations.
While agile approaches have gained an almost immediate acclaim among SMEs and
companies involved in non-critical projects, they were received with much distrust by
larger companies and software engineers engaged in long-term and/or critical projects.
In the case of such projects, the predictability and stability of plan-driven methodo-
logies can bring expected proﬁts [27] by facilitating the certiﬁcation processes and
establishing a repetitive quality. The up-front analysis and rigorous documentation
provide valuable foundations for further risk management and process traceability
[12]. What is more, some companies have years of experience in managing their pro-
jects following plan-driven practices, therefore they have acquired the know-how that
increases trust towards this approach [17], [32]. In [26], major challenges related to
moving from plan-driven to agile practices were summarized from a large corporate
company’s perspective.
While plan-driven methodologies have proven its value and usefulness in safety-
critical projects, the evolving market of software products of the last few years puts
this approach to the test. A growing competition, ever changing technologies and more
diverse groups of clients have changed the expectations towards software development
methods. The need to deliver systems of acceptable quality, faster and at lower cost
in comparison to competitors evoked seeking an alternative [28].
In this paper we discuss the models of combining agile and plan-driven practices
as well as their potential applications in safety-critical projects that were introduced in
the literature thus far. The main objective of our research is to develop a method that
would allow to combine agile and more disciplined practices in safety-critical projects
while keeping the acceptable level of safety assurance in accordance with the norms
and the standards applicable for a given product. The solution will be evaluated in
terms of added value for manufacturing processes of safety-related software. In this
paper we present the supporting ideas such as assurance argument patterns along
with a case study.
2. Balancing agility and discipline
For many years it has been prejudicially believed that agile methodologies are at
odds with maturity models and certiﬁcation schemes [18]. This point of view might
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Maturity Model (replaced with the Capability Maturity Model Integration [4]) and
an oversimpliﬁcation of agile values [18]. In fact, present-day models provide more
freedom than their predecessors while agile methodologies are not about the lack of
documentation and recklessness.
Attempts to combine the best of the two approaches, the agile and the disciplined
one, have been presented as early as in 2003 [13] and initiated a global discussion about
the need and applicability of such hybrid methodologies. Successfully combined, agile
practices can potentially reduce the cost of production as well as time to market
while more mature practices could improve the quality of the product and enable
better control of the development process. As a result, some models adapting agile
practices into maturity models such as CMMI have been introduced since then [16],
[25], [15], [14], providing new possibilities for companies engaged in long-term and
critical projects. What is more, case studies and evidence of successful applications
of such balanced approaches have been provided as well [18], [23], [29], [11], [30], [24].
3. Introducing agile practices to the safety-critical domain
In recent years a growing competition in the IT market has also inﬂuenced the safety-
critical domain. When it comes to medical software companies, they have evolved
from supporting only hospitals and doctors to providing personalized e-health so-
ftware solutions and equipment for individual patients. It has become crucial to oﬀer
better software, more appealing to a client while keeping the costs low, in order to
compete in this fast changing and growing market. Consequently, there is a strong
demand for increasing eﬃciency of software development processes (in terms of eﬀort,
user satisfaction and time) while still respecting the safety requirements imposed by
relevant standards, regulations and recommendations1.
3.1. Applications of the hybrid approaches
There is a growing body of evidence supporting the theory that incorporating agile
practices into safety-critical projects is not only feasible but also potentially proﬁtable.
In 2003 Alleman et al. [10] presented an approach combining eXtreme Programming
practices [7] with Earned Value Management [6] that was successfully implemented in
a government contracted project. In their article they described their experiences and
improvements obtained by using this approach although the approach itself was not
suﬃciently illustrated and little was mentioned about which features of the product
and its certiﬁcates had inﬂuenced the choice of practices.
Consecutive reports were more speciﬁc about successful implementations of their
hybrid approaches. Rasmussen et al. [31] described the application of a tailor-made
1For instance, US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends explicit assurance cases
for medical devices which will impact on the whole related suppliers market
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bott company. As a result of the rapid expansion of the market, which demanded
responding to the changing requirements as well as reducing production cost, the
company decided to employ a software engineering organization AgileTek [2], which
developed the Agile+ solution. They managed to improve their processes and achie-
ved the ﬁnancial goals by introducing a more agile approach while still maintaining
the acceptable level of FDA safety assurance. Unfortunately, because of a commercial
aspect of the Agile+ it was only brieﬂy described in the article, making it diﬃcult for
other companies to beneﬁt from Abbott experiences without external help.
Another interesting case study was presented in an article by Petersen and Wohlin
[28] in which they described the application of agile practices at Ericsson AB, which
is certiﬁed with ISO 9001:2000. They focused on comparing how the perceived impe-
diments have changed owing to the introduction of agile practices. The improvements
were noticeable as most of the concerns raised in relation to the plan-driven metho-
dologies were alleviated as well the number of perceived impediments was reduced by
introducing a more agile approach.
3.2. Models for adopting agile to safety-critical development
The increasing number of reports suggesting that adapting agile practices to suit
safety-critical processes can bring measurable proﬁts provoked the need for a model
of such adaptation.
In the literature we can ﬁnd some attempts to propose such models. Weiguo
and Xiaomin [35] presented an approach suitable for FDA compliant medical devices
projects. Their method was based on the idea of combining an incremental character of
developing code with a classic, waterfall-like way of preparing project documentation.
Unfortunately, the model was insuﬃciently described and we know very little about its
possible implementations. Stephenson, McDermid and Ward [34] presented another
model for tailoring agile practices to suit safety-critical systems. They called it the
Agile Health Model and it was built around the idea of modular structures and risk
management techniques known from plan-driven methodologies. However, the model
was in the preliminary stage, introduced mainly in order to prove the possibility of
applying agile practices into safety-critical projects, and no case study was provided
as well.
A more complex and well described model was presented by Paige et al. [27].
They collated agile and safety principles and demonstrated the key challenges that
need to be addressed when formulating a hybrid approach. Their main concerns were
diﬀerent approaches towards communication, documentation, customer participation,
multiple-domain engineering, testing and incrementality. Indeed, as much as agile
methodologies value an active customer participation it is often impossible in safety-
critical systems to keep in touch with every group of stakeholders, in particular if
we take external certiﬁcation organizations into consideration as well. Testing and
incrementality, both crucial to the agile development, are also diﬃcult to reconcile
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while in order to satisfy certiﬁcation bodies it is important to incorporate costly
and time consuming white-box and acceptance tests. What is more, the incremental
product development, one of the key attributes of all agile methodologies, can impede
the process of certiﬁcation and preparation of safety arguments as they should be
addressed up-front with all of the requirements and risks known beforehand.
Paige et al.’s solution concentrates on the following ideas: pair-programming of
software and system engineers, the introduction of risk management techniques, usage
of tools for generating documentation from source code and tackling the incrementa-
lity by using “pipelined iterations” consisted of the minor and major iterations with
acceptance tests at the end of every major one. Their model was implemented in a case
study in which an Integrated Altitude Data Display System (IADDS) for planes was
developed. As a result, their approach was put to the test as their solutions proved
to be insuﬃcient in some aspects. They concluded that although “XP and Aps (Agile
practices) in general were not designed with safety-critical systems development in
mind, they can be adapted to that sort of development”, “it is rather unlikely that
level A software can be produced in the near future with the modiﬁcations made to
the process so far” [27].
While these models of adapting agile practices to suit safety-critical projects are
valuable sources of knowledge, there is still a need to develop a more easy to use and
thorough set of guidelines for safety-critical software companies that would like to
adapt agile practices into their project development.
4. Assurance argument patterns
In [22] we have proposed an approach in which agile practices are introduced to
a development process in a controlled way, by applying assurance argument patterns.
This leads to a method which supports combining agile and more disciplined practices
in safety-critical projects while keeping the acceptable level of safety assurance, in
accordance with the assurance criteria chosen for a given product. The source of
these criteria are the relevant guidelines, norms and standards related to a given
application domain.
An argument is a data structure that includes claims, assumptions, facts and
evidence. A claim can be related to other claims, facts and/or assumptions through
an inference. In such cases this claim is called conclusion and the claims, facts and
assumptions linked to it by the inference are called its premises. The inference linking
the promises with the conclusion justiﬁes why while accepting the premises we are
entitled to accept the conclusion. An inference is associated with a warrant which
justiﬁes why the related conclusion should be accepted from the premises. If a gi-
ven premise is a claim, it is considered as a conclusion to be further justiﬁed by its
own premises. If a premise is an assumption, it does not require further justiﬁcation.
If a premise is a fact, it is required that it is supported by evidence submitted in
external documents. Such documents are linked to the fact by means of references.
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can occur in any place of the argument structure. This model of an argument belongs
to the TRUST-IT methodology [21], [19], [20] which also provides for graphical re-
presentation of arguments. The methodology is supported by a platform of software
services, called NOR-STA, which provide for arguments creation, editing, publishing,
integration with evidence and assessment [9].
An assurance argument pattern is an incomplete argument. A pattern has ‘dan-
gling references’ which do not point to any evidence – the evidence is missing in the
pattern. It is also possible, that the pattern contains unjustiﬁed claims which need to
be argued for in a more detailed way. After providing the evidence and completing
unjustiﬁed claims, the pattern is converted into an argument.
An example argument pattern is given in Figure 1.
Figure 1. An example argument pattern following the TRUST-IT argument model.
The pattern presented in Figure1 represents the top level decomposition of an
argument tree related to conformity with ISO/IEC 27001 standard on information
security management. The tree is represented from left to the right (just like the
ﬁle directory trees in an operating system interface). Figure 1 shows the information
nodes (labeled ‘I’) structuring the argument pattern. The information node labeled ‘I5’
contains the claim (denoted ‘CL ISO27001: Compliance with ISO/IEC 27001:2005’)
which predicates conformity with the standard ISO/IEC 27001. The conformity is
validated by the claim’s decomposition into more speciﬁc claims and ﬁnally ends
with asserting facts. Figure 1 presents the decomposition of the argumentation to
ﬁve more speciﬁc claims. The inference (represented by the node labeled ‘Arg’ and
the associated warrant labeled ‘W’) relating these more speciﬁc claims (the premises)
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decomposition into chapters).
We assume that such argument patterns can be built for a given software develop-
ment project by analyzing the requirements of the relevant guidelines and standards
related to software assurance in a given domain. The requirements can address both,
the (software) product to be developed and the development process leading to this
product. In our research, the primary focus is on the development process and on the
assurance that is required in case agile practices are incorporated to the process.
In order to better understand the safety risks introduced by the agile software
practices we plan for a series of experiments and cases during which we will attempt
to assess these risks. The remainder of this paper describes a case study in which
junior software engineers were involved in the risk assessment process.
5. Case study
The domain of medical safety-critical software has been developing at an unpreceden-
ted speed over the past few years. In addition to supplying hospitals and providing
solutions for medical staﬀ it now brings a wide variety of e-health technologies, inc-
luding personal medical equipment and devices. In order to not be left behind and
to reach bigger and more diverse customer groups, medical companies might look for
new software development processes to reduce costs, accelerate time to market and
improve product quality. For this reason we have decided to use that domain for our
case study.
The case study was carried out between the beginning of March 2012 and the
end of May 2012. For this study we have selected a group of 31 postgraduate stu-
dents from our university that specialize in the ﬁeld of software engineering. Some
67% of them have already began to work as part-time employees in various software
companies and the majority of this group already have applied agile practices in their
industrial work. Although they did not yet have real experience with safety critical
software development, all participants have attended courses on plan-driven and agile
methodologies and completed the course on high integrity systems.
5.1. The case study objectives
The main objective of the case study was: to investigate how (junior) software engine-
ers identify and assess risks associated with applying selected agile practices to critical
software development and what are their suggestions concerning risk mitigation.
It is expected that the results of the case study will help to devise a checklist
of hazards as well as risk estimates and the suggestions for additional risk mitigation
practices for incorporating agile practices into safety-critical software development.
The metrics to be collected in the case study include:
• List of hazards for an insulin pump applied in its target environment.
• A complete list of agile practices.
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software hazards.
• Risk assessment (risk levels) associated with each agile practice used.
• Agile practices which carry the highest risk.
• A list of risk mitigation recommendations.
5.2. The case study domain description
We devised a ﬁctional company called MediSoft and speciﬁed its operational activi-
ty as producing software for insulin infusion pumps. After observing an increasing
role of agile methodologies the company’s management team became interested in
the possible beneﬁts that might be gained by utilizing such methodologies in their
workplace. As a way to investigate the eﬀects of the introduction of agile approaches
into software development, MediSoft chose to carry out a pilot project whose aim is
to prepare software for insulin infusion pump. They would like to employ eXtreme
Programming [7] and Scrum [33] methodologies.
Figure 2. A context diagram of the insulin pump.
Students were divided into 11 project groups, each group consisting of not more
than 3 members. Every group was given a short description of MediSoft company as
well as product speciﬁcation for standard infusion pump and guidelines on hazards
analysis. They were also supposed to use the Designsafe tool [5] for risk assessment
and MS Visio for fault trees editing.
An insulin pump is a device for patients with diabetes who need to control their
blood sugar level by administrating insulin. The pump is attached to the patient’s
body along with a small container ﬁlled with insulin. At the proper times, small
and precisely calculated amounts of insulin are released from the container into the
patient’s bloodstream. It helps to keep blood glucose levels steady between meals and
during sleep.
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to match the grams of carbohydrate in the food that is eaten.
The insulin pump description used in the project is based on the Animas One-
Touch Ping [3], a real pump available on the market, characterized by the following
features:
• Calculator for carbohydrates, blood glucose corrections and insulin.
• Insulin bolus very precise, should allow dosing even the lowest amounts of insulin
in order to respond to every glucose deviation.
• Reminders for when to perform blood glucose checks.
• Easily available insulin dose corrections.
• Measuring the level of active insulin in the body.
• Wireless communication, the pump can be controlled with a wireless remote.
• Wireless bolus calculation and delivery.
• Uploading data from the pump to a computer using dedicated software.
• Information about the state of the body shown on the screen.
• Waterproof.
5.3. Participant’ tasks and the results.
The case study has been divided into three tasks. After completing each task, the
participants submitted the results using Moodle course management system [8].
Task 1. Preparing a list of hazards and hazard scenarios. Based on a documentation
of the insulin pump and their own knowledge and imagination each group prepared
a list of hazards connected with using the insulin pump in its target environment. This
hazards identiﬁcation process was supported by a guideline obtained at the beginning
of the case study. The groups were also provided with an inventory of agile practices
represented in the Designsafe tool [5]. After identifying hazards, they were asked to
analyze the potential causes of each hazard and to document the result as a fault
trees (FTA diagrams in MSVisio). Of particular interest were these fault trees for
which the represented hazard scenarios were ‘anchored’ in the software development
practices. Some groups had their Designsafe tool ‘populated’ with Scrum practices
(see Figure 3) and the others with eXtreme Programming ones. The groups were free
to extend this initial seeding, if they found it necessary.
Task 2. Conducting risk assessment. Each group performed, with the help of De-
signsafe tool, a risk assessment for the introduction of agile practices to the project
developing software for the insulin pump.
Based on the fault trees prepared in Task 1, the groups analyzed the connection
between the development related impediments and the identiﬁed hazards. This work
resulted in reﬁning the fault trees and possibly with reﬁning the lists of development
process impediments submitted initially.
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likelihood of its materialization. An example of such a risk analysis is given (Table 1).
Table 1
An example of a simple hazard analysis (based on Designsafe layout).
Name Insulin overdose
Hazard category Software fault
Description The pump infuses a too high dosage of insulin due to insulin overﬂow or
air pressure in lines.
Users All
Connected Tasks Product Backlog/Requirements Managements, Risk management, Tech-
nical analysis, Dose calculation algorithm design, Implementation, User
Interface project, User’s guide preparation
Cause Faulty dose calculation algorithm, wrong requirements analysis, error in
the implementation, misleading user interface or manual, database error
Severity Catastrophic
Probability Likely
Risk Level High
Reduce Risk Extensive testing, up-front technical analysis, good contact with the
client representative, regular iterations, testing user interface and ma-
nual with real patients and doctors
Table 2 presents the risk assessment matrix used in this task.
Task 3. Proposing a list of risk mitigation practices. The groups were asked to
propose a list of additional practices that would mitigate the risks found in Task 2
and that could be used as an extension to the agile methodology they have been
working with.
Upon completion of the tasks, a common session was organized for all participants
were they were discussing on how incorporating agile practices into safety-critical
projects can aﬀect the product risk and what mitigation actions could be employed
during the development process to lower the risk.
5.4. Results
Results of the tasks are summarized below. As the experiment was completed at the
beginning of June 2012, the raw data collected are not yet fully processed at the time
of writing this text. Nevertheless, some interesting observations can be made.
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The risk assessment matrix.
Severity of harm
Probability of harm Catastrophic Serious Moderate Minor
Very Likely High High High Medium
Likely High High Medium Low
Unlikely Medium Medium Low Negligible
Remote Low Low Negligible Negligible
Table 3
A template for the additional practices description.
No. Name of the practice
Description A description of the proposed practice – what activities it inclu-
des, how should they be performed, by whom, at what stages of
the project.
Related hazards Which hazards (from your risk analysis) the practice is expected
to have inﬂuence on.
Expected inﬂuence What is the expected result of implementing the practice, in what
way it could reduce the risk, to what extent.
Agility/discipline balance How the practice will aﬀect the agility of the methodology ie. will
it require some alterations in project roles or additional project
stages etc.
Results of Task 1. Overall, the 11 teams have distinguished 124 hazards and poten-
tially hazardous situations in total, at diﬀerent levels of detail. The hazards were not
independent, often were synonymous, the diﬀerences were also in the scope and level
of detail. After rough processing, they can be grouped into the following categories:
• User errors (adjusted dose, incorrect conﬁguration, etc.).
• Error in measuring the level of insulin or sugar.
• Physical / hardware errors.
• Missing or incorrectly administered insulin doses.
• Lack of measurement of insulin or sugar within a prescribed period.
• Errors in alerting system (sugar level, the needle slipped, discharging, etc.).
• Unauthorized use of the device via radio waves.
• Interruption of system normal activity.
• Incorrect display of data.
Most of the hazards were further analyzed in a form of fault trees. An example
is given in 4. The fault trees delivered as the result of this task were treated as
an input to the next task where the groups were aiming at assessing risks. They
were asked to concentrate on hazards connected with the software and human error
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176 Janusz Górski, Katarzyna ŁukasiewiczFigure 4. An example Fault Tree from one of the groups (Kalenik, Kurszewski, Karewska).
rather than hardware or misfortunes, to drive them towards events originating in the
software development process. They were also encouraged to consider latent conditions
related to organizational structure and management practices, having in mind the
agile project development practices.
Results of Task 2. Risk assessment was performed with the help of Designsafe tool.
During this task the groups were also reﬁning the fault trees developed in Task 1. The
results of risk assessment were presented in the tool, an example is given in Figure 5.
The project tasks associated with the highest risk together with their impedi-
ments are listed below.
For SCRUM:
• Product Backlog – incorrect identiﬁcation of requirements.
• Sprints Plan – incomplete identiﬁcation of requirements.
• General decisions concerning technology and architecture – lack of architecture
plan and crucial implementation decisions.
• General decisions concerning technology and architecture – incomplete architec-
ture plan and lacking crucial implementation decisions.
• Providing the requirements (client) – incorrect identiﬁcation of requirements.
• Providing the requirements (client) – incomplete identiﬁcation of requirements.
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highest risk:
• User Stories – incomplete identiﬁcation of requirements.
• Prototyping – too general plan for architecture and methods of implementing of
the system.
• Release scope: functionalities from previous iteration – large load on errors from
the previous iteration.
• Tests preparation – incomplete test plan.
• Unit tests – low coverage.
• Aacceptance tests – low coverage.
Results of Task 3. In this task the groups were asked to consider possibilities of
risk mitigation, especially for the hazards with the highest risk. The most commonly
proposed mitigation practices included:
• Introducing an expert knowledge into the project.
• Extensive testing (i.e. enhanced acceptance tests, Test Driven Development).
• Introducing safety standards.
• Improving quality assurance in relation to the artefacts diﬀerent than the code
(i.e. preparing really ‘good’ User Stories).
• Keeping high coding standards.
6. Conclusion
The paper introduced our approach to the problem of introducing agile practices into
critical software development processes and then reported on the experiment during
which we attempted to investigate how this problem is perceived from the software
engineer’s perspective.
The data collected during the experiment were not yet ﬁnally processed, therefore
what is presented in this paper reports more on the scope of the raw data collected
than presents the ﬁnal conclusions derived from these data. Nevertheless, even now
we can conclude that the participants of the experiment were generally optimistic
towards agile methodologies and their applicability to safety-critical projects. Their
opinions can be summarized as follows:
• Agile methodologies should be regarded as complementary to plan driven prac-
tices instead of being the replacement.
• Extensive testing and good identiﬁcation of requirements are vital.
• Contact with domain experts and potential users is crucial.
• Safety assurance should be incremental – in parallel to iterations in development.
However, as the participants of the experiment were students we do not expect
that they performed their analyses at the expert level. Their output reﬂects the opi-
nions of junior software engineers, their concerns regarding adapting agile practices
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promises.
In further research we will aim at incorporating other views (for instance, softwa-
re developing companies, project managers, assessors, etc.). in order to learn which
practices cause most uneasiness and distrust and how they could be revised in or-
der to make them more compliant with safety standards. In parallel to this we will
investigate safety standards, guidelines and regulations (focusing on the e-health do-
main) to reﬂect them in the assurance argument pattern represented with the help of
TRUST-IT methodology and NOR-STA services.
References
[1] Agile manifesto. http://agilemanifesto.org.
[2] Agiletek. http://www.agiletek.com/.
[3] Animas one touch ping. insulin pump.
http://www.animas.com/animas-insulin-pumps/onetouch-ping.
[4] Capability maturity model integration. http://www.sei.cmu.edu/cmmi.
[5] Designsafe tool. http://www.designsafe.com/.
[6] Earned value management. http://www.earnedvaluemanagement.com/.
[7] Extreme programming: A gentle introduction.
http://www.extremeprogramming.org/.
[8] Moodle. http://moodle.org/.
[9] Nor-sta services portal. www.nor-sta.eu/en.
[10] Alleman G. B., Henderson M., Hill C. H. M., Seggelke R.: Making Agile Devel-
opment Work in a Government Contracting Environment Measuring velocity with
Earned Value. Proc. of the Agile Development Conference 2003, Salt Lake City,
Utah, June 2003.
[11] Babuscio J.: How the FBI learned to catch bad guys one iteration at a time. In
2009 Agile Conference Proceedings, Chicago, USA, pp. 96–100. August 2009.
[12] Boehm B.: Get ready for agile methods, with care. IEEE Computer, 35, 2002.
[13] Boehm B., Turner R.: Balancing Agility and Discipline: A Guide for the Perple-
xed. Addison Wesley, 2003.
[14] Bulska K. M. J.: Łączenie zwinności metodyki SCRUM z dojrzałością modelu
CMMI. (Integration of the agile SCRUM practices with the maturity of CMMI).
In National Conference of Software Engineering (KKIO), 2010.
[15] Diaz J., Garbajosa J., Calvo-Manzano J.: Mapping CMMI Level 2 to Scrum
Practices: An Experience Report. Proc. EuroSPI 2009 Alcala, Spain, September
2009.
[16] Fritzsche M., Keil P.: Agile methods and CMMI: Compatibility or conﬂict?,
vol 1(1). 2007.
[17] Ge X., Paige R., McDermid J.: An Iterative Approach for Development of Safety-
Critical Software and Safety Arguments. IEEE, 2010.
21 listopada 2012 str. 16/18
180 Janusz Górski, Katarzyna Łukasiewicz[18] Glazer H., Anderson D., Anderson D. J., Konrad M., Shrum S.: CMMI or Agile :
Why Not Embrace Both ! Software Engineering Process Management. Technical
Note for Software Engineering Institute.
[19] Górski J.: Trust Case — a case for trustworthiness of IT infrastructures. 196:125–
142, 2005.
[20] Górski J.: Trust-IT – a framework for trust cases. Workshop on Assurance Cases
for Security — The Metrics Challenge. Proc. of DSN 2007, June, 25-28:204–209,
2007.
[21] Górski J., Jarzebowicz A., Leszczyna R., Miler J., Olszewski M.: Trust case:
Justifying trust. it solution. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 89:33–47,
2005.
[22] Górski J., Łukasiewicz K.: Agile development of critical software, can it be justi-
ﬁed? Proc. 7th ENASE Conference, Wroclaw, Poland, 2012.
[23] Lindvall M., Muthig D., Dagnino A., Wallin C., Stupperich M., Kiefer D., May
J., Kahkonen T.: Agile software development in large organizations. Computer,
37(12):pp. 26–34, 2004.
[24] M. P., Mantyniemi A.: An Approach For Using CMMI in Agile Software De-
velopment Assessments: Experiences From Three Case Studies. Proc. of SPICE
Conference, Luxembourg, May 2006.
[25] Marsal A., de Freitas B., Furtado Soares F., Furtado M., Maciel T., Belchior
A.: Blending SCRUM practices and cmmi project management process areas.
Innovations in Systems and Software Engineering, 4(1):17–29, 2008.
[26] P. F.: How can you be Agile in “Rough Terrain” and under “Tight Boundary
Conditions”. Proc. 7th ENASE Conference, Wroclaw, Poland, 2012.
[27] Paige R., Charalambous R., Ge X., Brooke P.: Towards Agile Engineering of
High- Integrity Systems. Proc. of 27th International Conference on Computer
Safety, Reliability and Security (SAFECOMP), September 2008.
[28] Petersen K., Wohlin C.: The eﬀect of moving from a plan-driven to an incre-
mental software development approach with agile practices. Empirical Software
Engineering, 15(6):654–693, 2010.
[29] Poppendieck M.: Lean software development: an agile toolkit. Addison-Wesley,
2003.
[30] Potter N., Sakry M.: Implementing Scrum (Agile) and CMMI together. Process
Group Post Newsletter, 16(2), January 2012.
[31] Rasmussen R., Hughes T., Jenks J. R., Skach J.: Adopting Agile in an FDA Regu-
lated Environment. Agile Conference Proc. , Chicago, USA, August 2009.
[32] Rottier A., Rodrigues V.: Agile Development in a Medical Device Company.
IEEE, 2008.
[33] Schwaber K., Beedle.: Agile Software Development with Scrum. Prentice Hall,
2001.
21 listopada 2012 str. 17/18
Assessment of risks introduced to safety critical software (...) 181[34] Stephenson Z., McDermid J., Ward A.: Health Modelling for Agility in Safety-
Critical Systems Development. Proc. of the First IET International Conference
on System Safety Engineering, June 2006.
[35] Weiguo L., Xiaomin F.: Software Development Practice for FDA-Compliant Me-
dical Devices. Proc. of the 2009 International Joint Conference on Computational
Sciences and Optimization, 2009.
Aﬃliations
Janusz Górski
Gdańsk University of Technology, Department of Software Engineering, Faculty of
Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics, jango@eti.pg.gda.pl
Katarzyna Łukasiewicz
Gdańsk University of Technology, Department of Software Engineering, Faculty of
Electronics, Telecommunications and Informatics, katarzyna.lukasiewicz@eti.pg.gda.pl
Received: 30.04.2012
Revised: 4.07.2012
Accepted: 3.09.2012
21 listopada 2012 str. 18/18
182 Janusz Górski, Katarzyna Łukasiewicz